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Abstract
Dissenting opinions in European Court of Human Rights judgments are a familiar phe-
nomenon. Nevertheless, they receive little or no systematic attention. This essay pres-
ents a typology of dissenting opinions in religion cases in the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court. It identifies patterns of dividing lines within Grand Chamber decisions 
in religion cases and discusses these patterns.
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1 Introduction
The 1993 Kokkinakis judgment was the first in which the European Court of 
Human Rights (hereafter: the European Court, the Court, or the ECtHR) found 
a violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (here-
after: the Convention or the ECHR), the right that guarantees the freedom of 
thought, conscience or religion. The judgment was not unanimous. Unlike the 
Commission before it, the Court was divided. The dictum of violation of Article 9 
of the Convention was supported by 6 votes to 3. The Court also held with 
8 votes to one that there had been no breach of Article 7 of the Convention. It 
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was  unanimous only in its conclusion that it was unnecessary to consider the 
case under Article 10 or under Article 10 taken in conjunction with Article 9.1
Dissenting opinions in European Court judgments are a familiar phenom-
enon. The wide-ranging attention that specific religion cases attract in the 
national and international academic world includes cases with dissenting 
opinions. Spectacular cases such as the Italian Lautsi concerning the lawful-
ness of a crucifix in the public class room or the Norwegian Folgerø case that 
was decided with a vote of 9–8 are cases in point.2
Still, dissenting opinions are one of the features of ECtHR judgments that 
receive little or no attention as such. This is true for religion cases as well. The 
lack of interest in dissenting opinions is not surprising. It is the majority that 
decides the case and the judgment in the case is built around the view of the 
majority. In the course of time, the Court has developed an elaborate set of 
‘general principles’ that have become part and parcel of its interpretation and 
understanding of Article 9 and it is these principles that are applied to the par-
ticular case. And, as we shall see, it is hard to attribute, at least at first sight, a 
wider-ranging meaning to a dissenting opinion than merely a dissenting opin-
ion in the particular case.
Nevertheless, dissenting opinions in religion cases of the European Court 
deserve systematic analysis. A systematic analysis of dissenting opinions helps 
us to gain a deeper understanding of the reasoning of the majority speaking 
for the Court. This is all the more so as religion cases increasingly seem to 
have become controversial issues in states that are party to the Convention. 
Furthermore, judgments in religion cases by the European Court are often 
extensively commented on and criticized. It is not always easy to predict an 
outcome of a case based on knowledge of previous case law and the interpreta-
tive principles that the Court has developed in the context of Article 9 of the 
Convention.
This article presents a typology of dissent in religion cases of the European 
Court based on a systematic analysis of dissenting opinions. It focuses on 
Grand Chamber judgments. These judgments are of particular interest as 
they concern highly contested issues. Judgments of the Chamber—and of the 
1   European Court of Human Rights (chamber), Kokkinakis v. Greece, Application No. 14307/88, 
25 May 1993.
2   European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Folgerø et al. v. Norway, Application 
No. 15472/02, 29 June 2007; European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber); Lautsi v. 
Italy, Application No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011.
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 former Commission—are taken into account in as far as they deviate from the 
Grand Chamber in their previous judgment or report respectively.3
2 The Expectations
In assessing whether Article 9 of the European Convention has been violated, 
the European Court follows a consistent line of approach. It consecutively de-
termines whether a complaint falls within the scope of Article 9, and, if so, 
whether there has been an interference with this right. When this has been 
affirmed, the Court examines whether the interference is ‘prescribed by law’, 
and, if so, whether the state has pursued a legitimate aim. After this last ques-
tion has also been positively ticked off, the issue remains as to whether the 
interference is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. The Court has developed 
the so-called doctrine of the ‘margin of appreciation’.4 According to this doc-
trine, the state is granted a certain room for manoeuvre in making its own as-
sessment whether the contested action was ‘necessary’. The Court usually adds 
that this margin of appreciation ‘goes hand in hand with a European supervi-
sion embracing both the law and the decisions applying it’.5
This approach is not only followed in relation to Article 9 ECHR, but also in 
relation to other Convention articles that are relevant to our analysis, such as 
the right to respect for private and family life (Article 8), freedom of expres-
sion (Article 10) or freedom of assembly and association (Article 11). Article 2 
of Protocol 1, which guarantees the right to education, however, has a different 
structure, and, therefore, does not lend itself to the same approach.6 The same 
3   For a detailed analysis of dissenting opinions in religion cases in the Grand Chamber, see 
Sophie van Bijsterveld, ‘Dissenting Opinions in Religiezaken voor het Europees Hof (I): De 
Grote Kamer’, 6(3) Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 2015, pp. 28–48; and, for dissenting 
opinions in religion cases in the Chamber, see Sophie van Bijsterveld, ‘“Dissenting opinions” 
in Religiezaken voor het Europees Hof (II): De gewone kamer’, 7(1) Tijdschrift voor Religie, 
Recht en Beleid (2016), pp. 27–58.
4   On the margin of appreciation in religion cases, see the contribution by Stephanie Berry’, 
‘Religious Freedom and the European Court of Human Rights’ Two Margins of Appreciation’, 
12:2–3 Religion and Human Rights (2017), pp. 198–209, this special issue.
5   See, for instance, paragraph 110 of the Grand Chamber judgment in the case Leyla Sahin v. 
Turkey, Application No. 44774/98, 10 November 2005.
6   On Article 2 of Protocol 1, see the contribution by Jeroen Temperman, Parental Rights in 
Relation to Denominational Schooling’ under the European Convention on Human Rights, 
12:2–3 Religion and Human Rights (2017), pp. 142–152, this special issue.
Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2019 10:17:39AM
via Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
226 van Bijsterveld
Religion and Human Rights 12 (2017) 223–232
is true for Article 6, paragraph 1 (right to fair trial), a right that is invoked in 
religion cases as well.
The first expectation is that that dissenting opinions focus on the question 
whether an interference is ‘necessary in a democratic society’. More specifi-
cally, one could expect that the application of the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation is a central theme in dissenting opinions; an expectation that is 
strengthened by the fact that scholarly criticism of the Court’s judgments in 
religion cases regularly criticizes precisely the Court’s use of this doctrine.7
A complainant may invoke more than one Convention article. In such cases, 
the European Court deals with the complaint under the most appropriate and 
relevant article and more than once it concludes that a review under the other 
article(s) is no longer necessary. It may also be expected that assessments in 
this connection make up for differences within the Court.
Division may always manifest itself with regard to other issues. However, 
the aims legitimately to be pursued by states are far-reaching; and, the Court 
has authoritatively defined the criterion ‘prescribed by law’. Because of this, 
controversy on these issues seems less likely.
3 Analysis: A Typology of Dividing Lines
Analysis of Grand Chamber decisions in religion cases does not confirm the 
expectation that a different assessment of the margin of appreciation to be 
awarded to the state forms the main reason for division within the Court. In 
none of the Grand Chamber cases studied, did the margin of appreciation as 
such play a recognizable role in the internal division. Even when mentioned, 
its role in the actual line of reasoning is not apparent.
However, two other, distinct dividing lines come to the fore. The first is 
the interpretation of freedom of religion, and related to this, the assessment 
of relevant facts and the choice of the Convention article under which to re-
view the case. The second dividing line, which is even more distinct, concerns 
the nature of the review itself. This dividing line can best be designated by 
7   See, for instance, Janneke Gerards, ‘Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation’, in 
17(1) European Law Journal (2011), pp. 80–120; Jan Kratochvíl, ‘The Inflation of the Margin of 
Appreciation by the European Court of Human Rights’, 29(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human 
Rights (2011), pp. 324–257; Susan S.M. Edwards, ‘No Burqa’s We’re French! The Wide Margin of 
Appreciation and the ECtHR Burqa Ruling’, 26 Denning Law Journal (2014), pp. 246–260.
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 introducing the concepts of abstract and concrete review.8 Abstract review 
takes place when the contested state activity itself is regarded to be in viola-
tion with the Convention or not, apart from the circumstances of the case. 
Concrete review takes place when the specific circumstances of the case are 
taken into account and are deemed decisive for the final judgment in the case. 
We will elaborate on this difference more specifically later in this section. We 
will give an example of each of the categories.
3.1 Interpretation of Freedom of Religion
A clear example of interpretation was at stake in the Armenian case of 
Bayatyan.9 The applicant in this case was a Jehovah’s Witness. He was drafted 
for military service. As a result of his refusal to perform military service on the 
grounds of his religious belief, he was convicted by an appeal court and sen-
tenced to 2,5 years imprisonment. Before the Court, the applicant asserted that 
his conviction formed an unlawful limitation of his rights under Article 9 of 
the Convention. The legal issue for the Court was whether refusal of perform-
ing compulsory military service fell within the ambit of the rights protected 
by Article 9. With a 16–1 majority, the Grand Chamber answered the question 
positively. In doing so, it reversed the judgment of the Chamber. In a 6–1 vote, 
the Chamber had previously concluded that Article 9 did not stretch to refusal 
of military service. Thus, the Chamber deliberately followed the line of the 
former Commission. Nevertheless, it chose to submit the issue to the Grand 
Chamber, which, in its decision referred to the Convection as a ‘living instru-
ment which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’10 and 
took into account the developments in law and practice. The Armenian judge 
voted with the majority in the Chamber case, and did not change opinion in 
the Grand Chamber case, a line of approach which was followed in two other 
chamber cases as well. This is a clear matter of interpretation of the scope of 
Article 9 of the Convention.
8    The concepts of abstract and concrete review thus refer to the method of reasoning in the 
context of a particular case in the ECtHR. These concepts should, therefore, not be con-
fused with the label ‘concrete review’ for judicial reviews in cases and controversies as 
opposite to the label ‘abstract review’ for judicial review in the abstract outside the con-
text of cases and controversies and initiated by another state institution, examples of 
which can be found in Germany or France.
9    European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Bayatyan v. Armenia, Application 
No. 23459/03, 7 July 2011.
10   Ibid., para. 62.
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Genuine matters of interpretation sometimes occur in a context in which 
slightly broader issues of assessment play a role. Thus, questions of which facts 
are actually relevant in the light of the Convention article under discussion 
come into play. A good example of such a case is the French case of Cha’are 
Shalom.11 The Jewish organization Cha’are Shalom was refused a license for 
ritual slaughter on grounds that it was not representative of the Jewish com-
munity in France as such, and that it did not have the required religious entity 
status under French law. A license, however, was granted to the umbrella orga-
nization from which the complainant was an orthodox breakaway. With a 15–2 
majority, the Grand Chamber, to which the case was relinquished, rejected the 
appeal. It pointed at the fact that the difference between the two organizations 
did not concern the method of slaughtering in the strict sense, but ‘merely’ 
the intensity of inspection afterwards of the slaughtered animal. According to 
the Grand Chamber Article 9 would be interfered with only in case it would be 
impossible for ultra-orthodox Jews to obtain the desired meat, such as through 
import or specifically labelled meat from France. In the slipstream of this rea-
soning, it also concluded that Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9 
ECHR was not violated. A minority of seven judges did conclude that Article 9 
was violated. A previously granted license did not dismiss the Court from care-
fully examining a license request from an applicant within the same religion. 
The matter of whether the meat could be obtained otherwise, was not deemed 
relevant. In the view of the minority, the real problem was the unequal treat-
ment of the organization in relation to the other one, therefore an issue under 
Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 9. Its assessment of the case under 
these articles also led to the conclusion of violation.
3.2 Abstract versus Concrete Review
The French S.A.S. case is a Grand Chamber case in which the divergence 
 between the majority and the minority judgment hinged on the nature of 
the review.12 The majority of the judges reviewed the case in an abstract way. 
The dissenting judges carried out a concrete review. The latter even explicitly 
criticized the majority on their approach to reviewing the case.
The S.A.S. case concerned a complaint by an Islamic woman. She alleged 
that the prohibition to conceal one’s face in public places violated amongst 
other things her rights under Articles 8, 9 and 10 taken separately and together 
11   European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, 
Application No. 27417/95, 27 June 2000.
12   European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), S.A.S. v. France, Application 
No. 43835/11, 1 July 2014.
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with Article 14 of the Convention, as it made it unlawful for her as a Muslim 
to wear the burqa and the niqab. She explicitly stated that she wore these out 
of her own free will, both in private and public, although not at all times; she 
also stated that she was willing to show her face for specific purposes, such as 
identification.
With a 15–2 vote, the Grand Chamber dismissed the claims of violation 
of Articles 8 and 9; it unanimously held that there had been no violation of 
Article 14 taken together with these articles; likewise, it held unanimously 
that no separate issues arose under Article 10. Finding its starting point in the 
aim of the French state to ‘guarantee the conditions of “living together” ’13 the 
Grand Chamber found the broad ban proportionate. It stated that the law did 
not ‘affect the freedom to wear in public any garment or item of clothing—
with or without a religious connotation—which does not have the effect of 
concealing the face’.14 It also pointed to the fact that the criminal sanctions 
were ‘among the lightest that could be envisaged’.15 And after paraphrasing the 
French state’s objective to ‘protect a principle of interaction between individu-
als, which in its view is essential for the expression not only of pluralism, but 
also of tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no democratic 
society’,16 it concluded that the introduction of a ban such as the contested one 
was ‘a choice of society’.17
The two joint partly dissenting judges not only criticized the justification of 
the aim of ‘living together’ under the Convention, they also rejected the ‘sacri-
ficing of individual rights to abstract principles’.18
4 Discussion
Awareness of the nature of the dividing lines within the Grand Chamber helps 
us gain a deeper understanding of Grand Chamber judgments. This is true 
for both divided and unanimous judgments. Likewise, it helps us in valuing 
Chamber judgments. Such understanding is all the more relevant as the ac-
tual argumentation of European Court judgments in religion cases often leaves 
13   Ibid., para. 142.
14   Ibid., para. 151.
15   Ibid., para. 152.
16   Ibid., para. 153.
17   Ibid., para. 153.
18   Dissenting opinion, para. 2.
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room for question. Insight into the patterns of dividing lines, provides a more 
direct grip on the actual handling of a case by the Court.
Analysis of dissenting opinions in the context of Grand Chamber judg-
ments in religion cases shows us that difference in view can hinge on the inter-
pretation of Article 9 of the Convention and, related to that, the choice of the 
viewpoint from which to assess the case. The choice of viewpoint concerns 
the choice of which right is most appropriate for reviewing the case under and 
the assessment which precise facts are relevant for this review.
Interpretation of Article 9 of the Convention in terms of defining its scope 
may involve clear-cut legal politics. Such was the case in accepting that a refus-
al of compulsory military service was protected by Article 9 of the Convention. 
Such explicit issues are usually not involved, but rather the question which 
facts of the case are most relevant to the Court’s review and which article of 
the Convention is primarily relevant for this review. These issues that arise are 
closely connected to the case itself and are important in themselves; they do 
not lend themselves well for a more general analysis. It remains remarkable, 
however, that at such a high level of judicial judgment, such fundamental dif-
ferences exist about the relevant facts and the perspective from which to deal 
with a case, also in the light of a quarter century of tradition in religion cases 
in the Court.
The most interesting difference in approach is that between concrete and 
abstract review. It manifests itself quite regularly, although the number of 
Grand Chamber cases is too small to draw further-reaching conclusions about 
its occurrence. When the European Court is called to decide whether a viola-
tion of Article 9 of the Convention, or a similarly structured right, has been vio-
lated, one of the successive questions the European Court needs to answer is 
whether an infringement by law that serves a legitimate purpose is ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’. It is within the context of this criterion that choice 
between abstract or concrete review is made.
Is the use of abstract review an instrument used the majority or minority in 
religion cases? And what about concrete review? On the basis of the analysis of 
Grand Chamber cases, these questions cannot be answered. The majority may 
resort to abstract review but so does a minority. The same is true for concrete 
review.
The question may be asked whether the use of abstract or concrete review 
in religion cases has any predictive value in terms of finding a violation of a 
Convention right. The answer is negative. Such predictive value cannot be 
established.
Does the latter change when we look at the material outcome of the case? 
The answer is negative again. Abstract review may be detrimental for the case 
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of religion, but it may also be beneficial to religion or the church. The same is 
true for concrete review.
We started with the expectation that the doctrine of the margin of appre-
ciation would play a significant role in dividing lines between the majority 
judgment and minority opinions in religion cases. Now we have detected a dif-
ference between concrete and abstract review as a prominent dividing line, 
the following question presents itself. How does the dividing between concrete 
and abstract review relate to the margin of appreciation? Can we say for ex-
ample that concrete review leads to less of a margin of appreciation for the 
state, something one might expect? The answer is negative. Both concrete and 
abstract review can produce a result that provides the state ample room for 
manoeuvre.
5 Conclusion
The expectation with which this analysis of dissenting opinions in religion 
cases in the Grand Chamber began, was that the dividing lines could predomi-
nantly be found in the assessment of whether an interference of the invoked 
Convention right(s) would be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. In this con-
text, it was anticipated that the focus of this assessment would be the degree 
by which a state was to be granted a ‘margin of appreciation’.
The analysis of dissenting opinions in Grand Chamber religion cases shows 
that the application of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation remain ever 
so hard to get a grip on. A wider margin of appreciation is likely in situations 
in which considerable differences exist between Member State with regard to 
the national legal arrangements concerning the issue in question; and, in situ-
ations in which a high level of controversy on issues like the one in question 
exists in Member States. Apart from these very general notions, it is hardly pos-
sible to get ‘closer’ to this concept. Even then, it seems that the concept ‘margin 
of appreciation’ can better be seen in terms of the outcome of a judgment, 
rather than a method of reasoning or an argument that plays an identifiable 
role in a clear weighing process.
However, patterns of dividing lines do exist. One dividing line concerns the 
interpretation of Article 9 of the Convention, and, related to this, the choice 
which facts of the case are relevant for reviewing the case. In a way, this is sur-
prising as one might think that 25 years after Kokkinakis and with the Grand 
Chamber itself close to its 20th anniversary, such issues would by and large 
have been settled.
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The second dividing line, and a prominent one at the same time, can best 
be characterized by labelling the differences in approach as abstract versus 
concrete review. The application of one or the other approach in the Grand 
Chamber religion cases led to different outcomes in the particular case. 
However, applying one or the other approach in general has no predictive 
value as to the outcome. Neither has it a predictive value as regards the mate-
rial position of religion, nor does it point to a wider or more narrow margin of 
appreciation. The conclusion that we must draw then is that the application 
of concrete or abstract review is an instrument in a particular case to reach a 
particular, desired outcome in that case. Of course, it is for the outsider not 
possible to know whether these types of review are used this way by the judges.
What does this result in? The possibility of delivering a dissenting opin-
ion fosters the visibility of the dialogues within the European Court. Another 
conclusion may be that cases that reach the Grand Chamber after first been 
through all the national judicial stages are simply: difficult cases.
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